Lorenzo Germinetti (Queen Mary University of London)
Can governments widen access to selective universities by shaping institutional incentives? Using linked administrative records on the universe of students in England, I investigate the effects of the incentives introduced under the Widening Participation policy between 2008/09 and 2016/17. I document how active government steering led universities to change the mix of policies they implemented to increase the intake of targeted students, primarily expanding their offer of outreach activities for this group. I investigate the ultimate impact on students' outcomes by adopting a regression discontinuity design leveraging area-based student targeting criteria. Targeted students apply to more selective programs: they are 2.4 percentage points (13%) more likely to apply to a program in the top 10% by selectivity - a reduction of the gap relative to their more affluent peers by up to one-third. These gains persist through admissions and enrollment, without compromising student success. Using a surrogate-index approach, I find that targeted students are 1.3 percentage points (7%) more likely to be in the top 10% of the within-cohort earnings distribution at age 30. The results highlight how institutional incentives can shape universities' behavior, reduce inequality in access to selective universities, and promote social mobility.