

The Role of Financial Connectedness in Predicting Crises

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
Goal

- **Assess whether financial connectedness is a strong predictor of financial crises.**
 - Type of crises: Systemic banking crises
 - Empirical tests: Global banking network (GBN)
- **Provide an Early Warning System for banking crises using a mix of:**
 - Data mining models (“classification algorithm”)
 - Leverage methods already proven successful in many different applications (manufacturing, terrorist attacks, etc.)
 - Standard regression analysis (probit/logit)
 - Drawing on larger ‘early warning systems’ literature, especially for currency crises in emerging market countries


Key Results

- The paper's key results are summarized in the next 3 charts.
- These depict the evolution of network indicators **conditional on country-specific factors and global shocks** before and after the onset of systemic banking crises
- We have removed the correlation of the network indicators with global factors and country-specific unobserved factors by regressing them against a full set of country and year dummies.


Key Result #1



Key Result #2



Key Result #3



The rest of the talk focuses on the evidence supporting the intuition provided by these results.


The Data

- **BIS locational banking statistics (1978-2010) on cross-border banking system exposures/assets (stocks of claims)**
- **Data represent the claims of banks in BIS reporting countries vis-à-vis borrowers in foreign countries**
 - Exposures include loans, securities and other bank assets
 - **Good coverage of cross-border banking activity**
 - Reporting banks in each reporting country account for more than 90% of total banking assets in that country
 - **Sample: 210 countries**
 - 29 “core” (BIS reporting) countries
 - 181 “periphery” countries
 - **Banking crisis incidence data: Laeven & Valencia (2012)**

From Data to Network Time Series

Global banking network, 2007

- We build binary and weighted directed networks for each year
- Nodes are countries
- Edge (a,b) from country a to b
 - Exists in our binary network if “a” has non-zero exposure to “b”
 - Edge is weighted by the size of the exposure (log) divided by the log-product of country GDPs.
- We do not have edges among periphery countries.



From Network Time Series to Structured Data

- **We represent the network time series data in matrix format:**
 - Rows correspond to country-year pairs
 - Columns correspond to
 - 1 dependent variable denoting whether a systemic banking crisis occurred or not (“crisis year), 0 otherwise (“tranquil year”)
 - 27 explanatory variables denoting network-based measures of connectedness in the GBN (+ lagged levels and growth rates up to 5 years \Rightarrow 162 variables)
 - centrality measures, clustering coefficients, etc.

Connectedness Measures: Examples

- **Degree and strength**
- **Fagiolo's (2007) clustering coefficients:** measures probability that neighbors of a node are connected with each other
- **Lopez-Fernandez (2004) clustering coefficient:** captures effectiveness of connection between neighbors of a node
- **Degree and strength of nearest neighbors (ANND, ANNS)**

1.0

Trend towards higher connectedness


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Classification Algorithm



- Find condition C on the network-based measures of connectedness such that:
 - $P(\text{crisis} = 1 \mid C)$ is high
 - $P(\text{crisis} = 1 \mid \text{not } C)$ is low
 - $|\text{crisis} = 1 \text{ AND } C|$ exceeds a threshold
 - $|\text{crisis} = 0 \text{ AND not } C|$ exceeds a threshold

Classification Algorithm

- **Ran the algorithm on three time periods:**
 - Full period: 1978-2010
 - First- and second-generation (“traditional”) crises: 1978-2002
 - Third-generation, advanced economy crises: 2003-2010

- **Evaluated the performance of the algorithm along two dimensions:**

- Precision
$$\frac{\text{\# correctly predicted crises}}{\text{\# predicted crises}}$$
 (Max when no “false alarms”)

- Recall
$$\frac{\text{\# correctly predicted crises}}{\text{\# actual crises}}$$
 (Max when no “missed crises”)

Results (in-sample)

Sample	Period	# crises	# predicted crises	Support	Precision	Recall	# sub-rules
		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Full	1978-2010	410	149	136	0.91	0.33	46
Full	1978-2002	330	354	292	0.82	0.88	297
Full	2003-2010	80	57	45	0.79	0.56	21
Core	1978-2010	88	63	58	0.92	0.66	36
Core	1978-2002	46	64	46	0.72	1.00	202
Core	2003-2010	42	25	23	0.92	0.55	3
Periphery	1978-2010	322	114	101	0.89	0.31	31
Periphery	1978-2002	284	145	133	0.92	0.47	44
Periphery	2003-2010	38	43	38	0.88	1.00	265



Too many rules

Example of One Specific Rule: All Countries, 1978-2010

When the growth over 3 years in average in-strength of in-neighbor nodes is between 0.12287 and 0.12334, then a crisis will occur.

- **If we considered the rules individually, precision was high but recall was low**
- **So we merged all rules into a “super-rule” by taking the OR of all the individual rules to predict crises**
 - **Increased recall with no loss of precision**

Example of One Specific Rule: All Countries, 2003-2010

Rule	Lower bound	Upper bound
$GrowthRate(HHI(v), -2)$	0.024124534	0.043913405
$GrowthRate(BCC_{C_{ycle}}^2(v), -5)$	-0.253523861	-0.195630671
$GrowthRate(HHI(v), -5)$	-0.040088371	-0.030071167
$GrowthRate(d_v^{in}, -3)$	0.005649713	0.011494258
$GrowthRate(d_v^{in}, -2)$	0.005747121	0.007042259
$GrowthRate(d_v^{in}, -2)$	-0.040000005	-0.024096381
$WCC_{Out}^2(v)$	0.095180728	0.09931889
$BCC_{In}^2(v)$	0.316091949	0.323436609
$AN^{in}(v)$	0.615592889	0.639510078
$GrowthRate(HHI(v), -1)$	0.011667656	0.0187932
$GrowthRate(d_v^{out}, -5)$	0.042105258	0.046875005
$GrowthRate(WCC_{C_{ycle}}^2(v), -5)$	-0.27239354	-0.199317272
$GrowthRate(HHI(v), -3)$	0.023758372	0.047009138
$GrowthRate(d_v^{out}, -2)$	-0.00961539	-0.005847948
$ANNS^{out,in}(v)$	13.21653627	13.37243705
$ANN D^{in,in}(v)$	38.46590909	39.05952381
$GrowthRate(d_v^{out}, -1)$	-0.029126219	-0.021276591
$GrowthRate(d_v^{in}, -1)$	-0.014184402	-0.01123595
$ANN D^{out,in}(v)$	37.31764705	38.03448276
d_v^{out}	70	72.00000001
$HHI(v)$	0.006006213	0.006213756

If we considered
the rules
individually,
precision was
high but recall
was low.

From Classification Algorithm to Regression Analysis

- **The classification algorithm identifies the following families of variables (sometimes with varying lags)**
 - Degree and strength of a country (node)
 - Clustering coefficients – both binary and weighted
 - Degree and strength of a country's neighbors (ANND, ANNS)
 - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
- **We group the indicators into 3 categories and extract the 1st and 2nd principal components**
 - 1st principal component typically explains 90% of the variation

Standard Regression Analysis (Probit)

- **Specified a probit model of banking crisis prediction with the following macroeconomic variables:**
 - Per capita income (GDP)
 - Net foreign assets /GDP
 - Dummy variable for sustained episode of capital inflows (“capital flows bonanza”)
 - Foreign exchange reserves/GDP
 - Real exchange rate misalignment (higher values indicate overvaluation)
- **Estimated the model with and without network indicators**

Included predictors both in 1-year lagged levels and growth rates



Probit Results:

Macroeconomic Fundamentals

Coefficients on macroeconomic variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant

(continued on next slide)


Probit Results: Add Network Indicators

- **Connectedness is statistically significantly associated with onset of crises:**
 - Higher own connectedness increases the likelihood of crises
 - Lower neighbor connectedness also increases it, suggesting contagion
 - AUROC between the baseline and enhanced models increases

Degree

Probit Results: AUROC Improvement

- AUROC rises from 0.696 (baseline) to 0.746 (enhanced model)
- Adding network indicators improves AUROC especially at high levels of false positives
- Financial connectedness helps improve crisis prediction especially for **conservative policymakers**



In-sample Prediction for Onset of 2007-08 Crises



Notes: For
core count
sample ov

Out-of-sample Prediction for Onset of 2007-08 Crises

Notes: For
subsample
prediction;

Take-home Messages

- Degree and strength of countries seem to go up before a crisis – and stabilize after it.
- Clustering coefficients go up 1-2 years before a crisis and then start dropping.
- Degree and strength of neighbors start dropping 3-4 years before a crisis, providing a potentially very early signal of a systemic banking crisis.

All of these financial connectedness measures can potentially form key signals for an early warning system.

Conclusion

- **Assessed the usefulness of network-based connectedness indicators for crisis prediction using an empirical GBN over 1978-2010**
- Focused on systemic banking crises in the last decade, when connectedness has played a more prominent role
- **Results based on two methods -- classification algorithm & standard regression model -- suggest that financial connectedness can help predict when crises occur**
- **Future work:**
 - Alternative sets of network indicators
 - Alternative empirical banking networks (more granular)