Eliana Viviano (Bank of Italy)
Tiziana Abete, Claudio Margarita, Clair Lavinia Moscatelli and Sabrina Quaresima
Using administrative labour force data from the Bank of Italy, we analyse the evolution of the so-called child penalty for women, measured as a reduction in hours worked and earnings after the birth of the first child relative to men. Compared with the penalty estimated in the literature for the Italian labour market, the Bank of Italys child penalty on average is significantly lower, but persistent. Importantly, thanks to some policies implemented in the last 15 years, younger cohorts of women face a significantly lower penalty than older ones. We show that the provision of childcare and a revision of career progression rules have helped younger women with children to climb the career ladder. By the use of data on couples we also show that parental leave for fathers can also potentially boosts womens hours and earnings.